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A T LONG LAST, the United Nations has promulgated a set of principles and rules concerning the applicability of International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) to military forces under its command and control. l 
From the time that the first United Nations force was put into the 
field-that is, into the Sinai2-and especially the first one that was required to 
engage in active military operations-in the Congo3-the question has been 
raised to what extent are or should such operations be subjected to IHL. This 
question became more urgent as the number and extent of UN military opera' 
tions suddenly increased in the 1990s-following the uniquely successful oper, 
ation in Namibia.4 As described below, the answer to what would seem to be a 
relatively simple question with an obvious answer (they should be!) has not 
been easy to arrive at. The present study is not intended as a contribution to 
the academic debate,S but rather catalogues the practical arrangements that 
have been made, or neglected, in this regard. Meanwhile, other essentially neg, 
ative developments such as the increasingly frequent assaults on UN forces and 
the brutality of many recent conflicts, have raised some related problems. The 
protection of UN forces, their responsibilities when faced with major violations 
of IHL, and their interaction with the international criminal tribunals estab, 
lished in the past several years will also be discussed briefly herein. 
UN Forces and International Humanitarian Law 
Background 
Blue Helmet6 operations come in many different shapes, sizes, and complex, 
ities, and in particular have various and sometimes varying or evolving man' 
dates. Although a few have been established by the UN General Assembly,7 
the great bulk were created by the Security Council. In doing so, the Council 
acted under two different sources of authority located somewhere in the UN 
Charter. The larger number, the so,called peace,keeping operations, are au, 
thorized under what Secretary,General Hammarskjold characterized as Chap-
ter VIYz, thus indicating that there was no specific Charter authority that could 
be cited.8 The remaining operations are authorized, or sometimes continued,9 
under Chapter VII, which in its Article 42 does foresee the Council deploying 
air, sea or land forces. lO 
There are yet other types of UN-authorized deployments of military forces, 
which are sometimes confused with the Blue Helmet operations mentioned 
above. The exemplars of the first of these types are the coalition forces that 
fought the Korean War in the 1950's and the Gulf War in 1991. Though both 
were specifically authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, and 
therefore considered by the public to be UN operations,11 they in effect con-
sisted of alliances, both of which were organized and led by the United States. 
Their status under the Charter was somewhat unclear; on the one hand, they 
could be considered as forces the Security Council "deployed" under Article 
42, though the Council retained almost no power over the organization of the 
forces and their actual operations; they could also be considered as merely col, 
lective self,defense operations authorized by the Council under Article 51; fi-
nally, they could be considered as simply falling under Chapter VII in 
general-as is the case, for example, with the establishment of the two War 
Crimes T ribunals12 under that Chapter without any specific article to rely on. 13 
The other type of non-UN operations are those that the Security Council "uti, 
lizes" under Article 53.1 of Chapter VIII {"Regional Arrangements"). 14 Both 
types can be characterized as examples of the Security Council "franchising" 
military operations to an ad hoc coalition or a regional organization. In any 
event, in view of the minimal influence the Security Council has so far exercised 
over the actual conduct of these types of operations 15-which is not to say that 
the Council could not, and perhaps should actually, exercise much stricter direc-
tion and supervision, as these operations could not legally take place without the 
Council's authorization-they will only be considered en passant in this study. 
Reverting now to UN Blue Helmet operations, what are their main charac, 
teristics? The execution of each of these operations or forces is delegated by the 
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establishing organ, normally the Security Council but sometimes the General 
Assembly, to the Secretary,General, who thus acts, in a sense (though the term 
is never used), as Commander,in,Chief. To the extent that any aspect of such 
operations is not specified by the establishing organ-and typically this is true 
of most aspects except for the basic mandate and the force strength-these de' 
terminations must be made by the Secretary,General or under his authority. 
He himself delegates this authority in several ways: (i) to the Un, 
der,Secretary,General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO); (ii) for some operations also to a Personal or Special Representative, 
who is a high, ranking staff member; (iii) and, for each operation, to a Force 
Commander. The latter is a military officer seconded by a member State to the 
United Nations and thus employed by the latter as a staff member; he is there, 
fore fully under the authority of the Secretary,General, and not under that of 
his government.16 The force, itself, is made up of military personnel supplied 
(made available) by member States to the United Nations, normally in the 
form of a distinct unit (e.g., a platoon, company, battalion) with its own cadre 
of commissioned and non,commissioned officers. They perform their functions 
as ordered by the Force Commander, but their internal discipline is maintained 
according to their national regulations. In particular, the punishment of any vi, 
olations takes place under national authority and not that of the United Na, 
tions.l7 These troops keep their national uniforms, but typically wear a blue 
helmet (hence their name) or beret and some shoulder insignia indicating that 
they constitute part of a UN force. They are also remunerated by and according 
to the rules of their country, though the UN provides them with a per diem and 
reimburses their governments for its outlays according to a uniform scale estab, 
lished by the General Assembly. 
Thus, except for the Force Commander, the military component of a UN 
force (there may also be police and civilian components) consists of national 
contingents (military units or, rarely, individuals) voluntarily provided by 
member States, 18 operating under general UN command as to their operations 
but still under national authority as to their behavior. This also means that to 
the extent such units and persons are required by international and/or national 
law to abide by IHL, in whole or in part, these troops continue to operate under 
such constraints even while under UN command.19 Whether these constraints 
could be loosened by the competent UN organs should they so direct is ex, 
plored briefly below. 
Though this has so far been the invariable practice in composing UN 
forces,20 it should be noted that this is not the sole possible model. In principle, 
the United Nations could recruit military personnel directly (or by 
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secondment-as is the situation of the Force Commanders) and employ them 
as UN staff21 to constitute a standing UN force. Currently, this is precluded by 
political and financial considerations, and therefore will not be further consid, 
ered in this study. It should, however, be noted that Article 3A of the Institute 
ofInternational Law's Zagreb Resolution22 specifically foresees and deals with 
this possibility. 
Finally, it should be noted that various UN forces have many different man, 
dates. One can distinguish between peace,keeping (the maintenance of a 
"peace" or at least an agreed cease,fire), peace,making (the imposition by force 
of a cease,fire on warring entities, whether these be those of different countries 
or of governmental and irregular forces within a country), peace,building (the 
reconstruction of a peaceful society in place of a previous war,torn one) 23 and, 
perhaps, solely humanitarian tasks (those merely assisting other UN opera, 
tions, such as UNHCR or UNICEF, or humanitarian NGOs in delivering and 
distributing food, medicine, and other humanitarian aid). A force may be ere, 
ated with a particular mandate and later have others imposed on it by the es, 
tablishing organ. Though normally one distinguishes between Chapter VIYz 
and Chapter VII mandates, in practice this distinction may tum out to be 
rather artificial,24 the important factor being the amount of force that is actu' 
ally required by and available to the components of the operation to carry out 
their assignment.25 
Thus, it is problematic to try to distinguish the status under IHL of a particu, 
lar UN military operation, whether based on its name, its initial or even its cur, 
rent mandate, or its establishment under different provisions of the UN 
Charter. Similarly, in light of how the conflict in Yugoslavia changed from an 
internal one within the SFRY to an international one as various constituent 
Republics gained de facto and later recognized de jure independence, and to 
some extent the similar developments within Bosnia itself, any conclusions as 
to the status or responsibilities of a UN force under IHL depending on whether 
a conflict is a civil or an international one is likely to lead to confusion and un, 
certainty.26 Probably the only useful criterion is whether or not a force is actu, 
ally engaged in combatP 
Application of IHL to UN Forces 
Multilateral Treaties 
The United Nations is not a party to any of the multilateral treaties in which 
the principles and rules of IHL are expressed. Although for some time the 
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ICRC pressed the organization to become a party to the 1949 Geneva Conven~ 
tions, especially to Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per~ 
sons in Time of War, 28 the United Nations raised two basic objections:29 (i) 
although intergovernmental organizations can become parties to treaties with 
States,30 including multilateral ones, the 1949 Geneva Conventions were only 
designed, as appears from their final clauses, for participation by States; and (ii) 
numerous provisions, especially of Convention IV, could only apply to States, 
which can exercise full governmental functions, such as the arrest, prosecu~ 
tion, trial and imprisonment of offenders against the Convention-which the 
United Nations is not equipped to do}1 Moreover, it was considered somewhat 
unseemly to suggest that the United Nations might be "a party" to a military 
conflict. Finally, the United Nations has pointed out that all the States that 
contribute military units to a UN operation are in any event bound by the prin~ 
cipal IHL treaties, as well as by customary IHL, and the obligations of these 
units thereunder are not diminished by the fact that they are in UN service. 
Using similar arguments, the United Nations also resisted making any gen~ 
eral declaration of acceptance of any or all such treaties. When it was suggested 
that the organization might in such a declaration indicate that its acceptance 
does not apply to parts of the treaties that are inapplicable to anyone except a 
sovereign State, the UN objected that such a selective acceptance might actu~ , 
ally endanger or weaken the integrity of the instruments in question. Instead, it 
had (as recalled below) in many instances undertaken to observe the "princi~ 
pIes and spirit," or more lately the "principles and rules," of these conven-
tions}2 Outside observers considered this formulation inadequate, preferring 
instead an undertaking to apply the instruments "mutatis mutandis." The orga~ 
nization was unwilling to go that far}3 
There have been a few instances in which the United Nations has, in effect, 
acted as at least a temporary territorial sovereign, but fortunately in these in~ 
stances no combat of any sort took place that would have raised obligations un~ 
der IHL. The first of these situations arose when the organization facilitated 
the transfer of West New Guinea from The Netherlands to Indonesia (October 
1962 to April 1963 ), for which purpose it established the United Nations Secu~ 
rity Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)}4 In the case of Namibia, 
although the General Assembly had invalidated South Africa's League ofNa~ 
tions mandate over South~ West Africa (Namibia), the actual arrangements by 
the Security Council for the establishment of the United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG)35 were such that the Council accepted the con~ 
tinuation of de facto South African control over the territory, to be exercised 
under UNT AG supervision until the attainment of independence-thus no 
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question of the UN exercising sovereign authority arose. Although the estab, 
lishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II)36 was 
on the basis that no effective government existed for the country, the mandates 
assigned to UNOSOM did not contemplate it exercising genuine governmen, 
tal authority. As part of the resolution of the Croatia/Serbia conflict, the 
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sirmium (UNT AES) administered the indicated areas in Croatia 
(formerly the Eastern Slavonia UNPA) from 1996 to 1998.37 In 1999 the 
United Nations established "an international civil presence in Kosovo," in ef, 
feet in a condominium with NATO, which is charged with establishing an "in' 
ternational security presence" there,38 as well as the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNT AET), which is "empowered 
to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration 
of justice."39 
In spite of the UN's resistance to accepting the Geneva and other IHL trea, 
ties by participation or a general declaration, the organization has, as discussed 
below, recognized their binding nature in respect of particular operations, both 
by means of the regulations issued for them and by the bilateral agreements 
concluded with host States and with troop' contributing States. 
International Customary Law 
The United Nations has never denied that its military operations are subject 
to customary IHL or that the substance of most of the significant IHL treaties has 
passed into customary law. Although questions might surface about the custom, 
ary law character of those parts of the Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Con' 
ventions that had not already had that character before their adoption, such 
doubts do not appear to have been raised by the United Nations itself. 
In the mid,1960s (evidently in wake of the Congo operation)39 a number of 
semi, official suggestions were made for the United Nations to accept explicitly 
the applicability ofIHL to its forces. These included resolutions adopted at the 
20th International Conference of the Red Cross40 and at the 52nd Conference 
of the International Law Association (ILA).41 After studying this question 
from 1965, the private but highly respected Institute ofInternational Law at its 
55th session, held in Zagreb in 1971, adopted a resolution on "Conditions of 
the Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in 
which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged,"42 of which Article 2 reads as 
follows: 
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The humanitarian rules oflaw of armed conflict apply to the United Nations as of 
right, and they must be complied with in all circumstances by United Nations 
Forces which are engaged in hostilities. 
The rules referred to in the preceding paragraph include in particular: 
(a) the rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities in general and especially 
those prohibiting the use or some uses of certain weapons, those concerning 
the means of injuring the other party, and those relating to the distinction 
between military and non-military objectives; 
(b) the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949; 
(c) the rules which aim at protecting civilian personnel and property. 
It might also be noted that the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel, which was adopted by the General Assem-
bly, explicitly excludes from its coverage "a United Nations operation autho-
rized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations ... to which the law of international armed 
conflict applies."43 This implies that the Assembly appeared to consider that 
IHL applies to at least some Chapter VII operations. 
Powers of the Security Council 
The question might be asked whether the General Assembly or the Security 
Council could exempt the United Nations and its forces from any of the provi-
sions of IHL. 
As to the General Assembly, the answer would appear to be negative, for all 
it may do under Charter Articles 10 and 11 is make recommendations to mem-
ber States. The Security Council can, of course, make decisions that are bind-
ing on members by Charter Article 25 and, for decisions made by the Council 
under Chapter VII, also by Article 48.1. This, then, brings Charter Article 103 
into play, under which in case of conflict between the obligations of a member 
under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, the former-and these certainly include binding decisions of the Coun-
cil-prevail. Thus, it would seem that the Council could supersede merely 
treaty-based IHL obligations. 
Whether and to what extent Article 103 also applies to international cus-
tomary law is not clear from the wording of that provision, though in general it 
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would seem that it should apply at least by analogy. This, however, would prob: 
ably not be true of any principles oflHL that are jus cogeru,44 as many commen, 
tators have asserted in general or with reference to particular rules. The 
difficulty is that, in the absence of any authoritative determination of what, if 
any, IHL principles have attained that unassailable status,45 any limits on the 
powers of the Security Council in this regard are vague. 
It should be noted that this discussion is entirely theoretical, for, so far, the 
Security Council has in no instance given any instruction to a UN operation, or 
authorization to a franchised one, that explicitly or implicitly contravened any 
IHL principle.46 
The Practice of the United Nations Relating 
to the Applicability of nIL to Its Military Forces 
Past and Recent Practice 
Particular Regulations. The Regulations issued by the Secretary,General 
for the conduct of the early peace,keeping operations of the United Nations, 
i.e., UNEF 1,47 ONUC,48 and UNFICYP,49 contained the following provision: 
The Force shall observe the principles and spirit of the general international 
Conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. (Emphasis added.) 
In a February 21, 1966, exchange of letters between the Secretary,General 
and the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the for, 
mer clarified this provision of the UNFICYP Regulations as follows: 
11. The international Conventions referred to in this Regulation include, inter 
alia, the Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions of 12 August 1949 [United Nations, 
Treaty Series, Vol. 75, pp. 31, 85,135, and 287]50 to which your Government is a 
party and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at the Hague on 14 May 1954 [United 
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 249, p. 215].51 In this connexioh, and particularly 
with respect to the humanitarian provisions of these Conventions, it is requested 
that the Governments of the participating States ensure that the members of 
their contingents serving with the Force be fully acquainted with the obligations 
arising under these Conventions and that appropriate steps be taken to ensure 
their enforcement."52 (The original footnotes are reproduced within the 
brackets.) 
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However, such regulations have not been issued for later UN forces or oper, 
ations, and thus, until the just,issued Secretary,General's Bulletin,53 there 
were no explicit instructions to them in respect ofIHL. However, as discussed 
below, for some time now pertinent provisions have been included in both 
SOFAs and the agreements with troop-contributing countries. 
Status,of,Forces Agreements. Normally, whenever possible, the Secretary, 
General concludes a Status,of,Forces Agreement (SOFA) with each country 
in which a UN force is to operate, specifying in considerable detail the respec, 
tive rights and obligations of the parties, particularly those regarding privileges 
and immunities. Inter alia, SOFAs exempt-the members of the force from the 
criminal jurisdiction of the host State, leaving it for their national States to im, 
pose any disciplinary or criminal penalties in respect of at least the military 
members of the force, while providing for the possibility of the Secretary, 
General waiving the immunity of civilian members (e.g., UN staff). 
Although no provision relating to IHL appeared in the Model SOFA com' 
municated by the Secretary,General to the General Assembly in 1990,54 in re, 
cent years the following provision has been included in these instruments: 
Without prejudice to the mandate of [acronym for the force-hereafter UNX] 
and its international status: 
(a) the United Nations shall ensure that UNX shall conduct its operations in 
[host State] with full respect for the principles and spirit of the general conven-
tions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. These international con-
ventions include the four Geneva Conventions of i2 August 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 
1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
(b) the Government undertakes to treat at all times the military personnel ofUNX 
with full respect for the principles and spirit of the general international conven, 
tions applicable to the treatment of military personnel. These international con, 
ventions include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977. 
UNX and the Government shall therefore ensure that members of their 
respective military personnel are fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of 
the above-mentioned international instruments.55 
Section 3 of the Secretary,General's Bulletin provides that in SOFAs the 
United Nations will ensure that its forces fully respect "the general conventions 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel" and that its forces be fully 
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acquainted with these principles and rules. It is further stated that the same ob-
ligations are to apply even in the absence of a SOFA. 
Agreements with Troop-Contributing States. The Model Agreement be-
tween the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and 
Equipment to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations contains the following 
standard clause: 
ApPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
28. [The United Nations peace-keeping operation] shall observe and respect the 
principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the 
conduct of military personnel. The international conventions referred to above 
include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the event of anned conflict. [The Participating 
State] shall therefore ensure that the members of its national contingent serving 
with the [United Nations peace-keeping operation] be fully acquainted with the 
ptinciples and spirit of these Conventions."56 
In practice, however, formal agreements along these lines are only rarely 
concluded with troop-contributing States.57 Presumably, were the Organiza-
tion to insist on the conclusion of such agreements, it might find it even more 
difficult to secure sufficient contingents for its several operations. 
On October 29, 1998, Bernard Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
keeping, announced to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly that 
troop-contributing States would be asked not to send civilian police or military 
observers younger than 25, and that troops in national contingents should pref-
erably be 21 but no less than 18.58 Aside from promoting thereby the principle 
that children under 18 should not participate in military forces, the minimum 
ages specified should help ensure that UN forces are constituted of persons ma-
ture enough to observe IHL. 
On August 25, 1999, the Security Council adopted a resolution on children in 
armed conflict, which inter alia requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the 
personnel involved in UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activi-
ties "have appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children."59 
General Regulation 
Development. Already many years ago it was suggested, in particular by the 
ICRC, that the United Nations should issue a general regulation {or 
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incorporate a section in a general directive concerning the governance of UN 
military forces} setting out somewhat more detailed provisions concerning the 
observance of IHL, which would supplement the rather anodyne clauses re~ 
cited above. The General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Op~ 
erations in April 1995 called on the Secretary~General "to complete the 
elaboration of a code of conduct for United Nations peace~keeping personnel, 
consistent with applicable international humanitarian law, so as to ensure the 
highest standards of performance and conduct."6o 
In June 1994 the ICRC arranged a Symposium on Humanitarian Action 
and Peace~keeping Operations, and as a follow~up it convened in March and 
October 1995 brief meetings of experts "to draw up a list of rules of inter~ 
national humanitarian law which were applicable to peace~keeping and peace~ 
enforcement operations and which should be taught in training programmes 
for all troops supplied to the United Nations."61 The ICRC's experts designed a 
relatively short list of rules excerpted from the basic instruments ofIHL, going 
back as far as the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration62 but relying most heavily on 
the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
This draft was conveyed to the Secretary~General and was considered 
within the Secretariat for a number of years. This lengthy dwell time resulted 
from several factors, including the diminished urgency due to the recent reduc~ 
tion in the number of UN operations in which military personnel are used for 
any except rather modest protective functions. In this context, the extensive 
references to combat operations and their consequences, such as the taking of 
prisoners and the custody of enemy wounded, and the need to protect civilians 
both in combat and in occupied territory, seemed to give a misleading impres~ 
sion of the scope and nature of UN military operations, especially the current 
ones. One can also imagine that at least some of the troop~contributing States 
would have expressed unease concerning the use of extracts from carefully ne~ 
gotiated treaties, in which particular rules are separated from the precisely 
worded restrictions and limitations in which they were originally embedded, 
and the heavy reliance on Protocol I, which has not yet gained the adherence 
of many of the principal troop contributors (though the particular provisions 
relied on are presumably not the ones these States find objectionable in the 
Protocol). Thus, it could not have been easy to find a middle ground between, 
on the one hand, the former general references to the principal conventions 
and, on the other, an unconditional acceptance of these instruments, by pick~ 
ing and choosing as especially binding only the most significant provisions. 
Although the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Op~ 
erations, while continuing to urge the completion of this project, also expressed 
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the view that it itself be consulted thereon,63 the Secretary,General ultimately 
held no formal consultations with the Committee or with any other intergov, 
ernmental body, but rather informally circulated a draft of the Bulletin to mem, 
bers of the Committee and took into account certain of their suggestions. The 
Bulletin,64 whose substantive provisions apparently depart only slightly from 
the 1995 ICRC experts' draft, was promulgated by the Secretary,General on 
August 6, 1999, on his own authority. 
Provisions. The Secretary,General's Bulletin consists of an introductory 
paragraph followed by ten Sections, many divided into several paragraphs. Sec, 
tions 1-4 and 10 deal with essentially formal matters, while Sections 5-9 set 
out the substantive provisions. 
Section 1, on "Field of application," specifies in paragraph 1.1 that the Bulle, 
tin applies to those situations when UN forces are engaged in armed conflict, 
whether in enforcement actions or as peace,keepers authorized to use force in 
self,defence; paragraph 1.2 states that the promulgation of the Bulletin does 
not affect the protection afforded to members of UN peacekeeping operations 
by the 1994 Convention.65 Section 2, "Application of national law," merely 
states that the provisions of the Bulletin are not intended to constitute an 
exhaustive catalogue ofIHL and that they are not intended to prejudice the 
full application of IHL, as well as of applicable national laws, to national 
contingents. The provisions of Section 3, "Status,of,forces agreement," were 
discussed above.66 Section 4, "Violations ofinternational humanitarian law," re, 
affirms that such violations are to be prosecuted in national courts67-though, 
presumably, this would not exclude the jurisdiction of the nascent Inter, 
national Criminal Court or of either of the existing War Crimes Tribunals 
(ICTY and ICTR) in applicable cases. Section 10, "Entry into force," estab, 
lishes that date as August 12, 1999, the 50th anniversary of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
The provisions of Section 5, "Protection of the civilian population," Section 
6, "Means and methods of combat," Section 7 , "Treatment of civilians and per, 
sons hors de c07!lbat," Section 8, "Treatment of detained persons," and Section 
9, "Protection of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel," are 
evidently adapted largely from the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and especially from the 1977 Protocol I thereto. As the specific 
sources are not indicated in the Bulletin, an attempt to do so has been made in 
Appendix II, which indicates what the apparent principal source of each provi, 
sion of the Bulletin is and what other parts of the codified IHL, and even some 
other provisions of international law, appear relevant. From that table it ap, 
pears that for the most part the paragraphs of Sections 5, 6 and 7 are precise 
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paraphrases of the indicated provisions of Protocol I, and those in Section 9 of 
Geneva Convention I, generally merely substituting "The United Nations 
force" for "The Parties to the conflict" or for the impersonal passive mode. On 
the other hand, the sub,paragraphs in Section 8 rely more indirectly on Geneva 
Convention III. 
Potential Questions. The Secretary,General issued his Bulletin on his own 
authOrity, deriving from his positions as "chief administrative officer" of the 
United Nations68and de facto Commander,in,Chief of UN Blue Helmet 
operations. In doing so, he was also responding to the 1995 call of the General 
Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations69-though not to 
its recent request that it be consulted in the process.70 
Incidentally, even though the Special Committee in this pronouncement re, 
ferred to "guidelines," which suggests a non,binding set of norms, its 1995 re, 
port had referred to a "code of conduct" and the actual Bulletin is drafted in 
that sense. It should be noted that the operative verbs in Sections 5-9 are all 
"shall," "shall not," "is prohibited," and similar expressions, thereby indicating 
binding obligations or prohibitions. There is no doubt that as Com, 
mander,in,Chief, the Secretary,General is authorized to express such com, 
mands and that if any troop' contributing State should object to such rules, it 
may not cause its troops to defy or disregard the Bulletin but can only withdraw 
them from UN operations. 
Although the Secretary,General had implicit authority to promulgate the 
Bulletin, this is not the only way in which it could have been issued and given 
legal force. Either the General Assembly or the Security Council could have 
promulgated such a code and, indeed, if either should now do so, such code 
would, at least as far as it specified, supersede that of the Secretary,Generai. 
Equally, it would be possible for either the Assembly or the Council to nullify 
the new Bulletin,71 but the Secretary,General must have calculated both that 
this is most unlikely to happen and that the likelihood of either of those bodies 
reaching an early agreement on any code of their own as also being minimal. 
It is also clear that by its terms the Bulletin only applies to "United Nations 
forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control."72 
It thus does not purport to apply to operations merely authorized by the Secu, 
rity Council (such as those described earlier). Nor could the Secretary,General 
have issued any code or even guidelines in respect of such operations, which 
are not under his command; at most he can suggest to the Council that some 
such rules be issued.73 Only the Security Council could, as a condition for au, 
thorizing any military operation to be carried out by States or by regional orga, 
nizations, whether under Charter Article 42,51, or 53, make it a condition that 
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these be carried out in compliance with general or specific provisions of IHL, 
such as those set out in the Bulletin, applied mutatis mutandis. 
It should be noted that even though paragraph 1.2 of the Bulletin refers to 
the 1994 "Safety" Convention, and that treaty refers to the applicability oflHL 
to certain UN operations,74 these two instruments do not fit together 
seamlessly. The Convention excludes from its coverage Chapter VII operations 
"in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized 
armed forces," while the Bulletin applies to all situations (that is, not only 
Chapter VII operations or those in which the opponents are organized armed 
forces) of armed conflict when UN forces are engaged therein as active com, 
batants. Thus, there may be situations in which both the Bulletin and the Con, 
vention would seem to apply (e.g., self,defensive combat in Chapter VIYz 
operations, or Chapter VII ones against unorganized militias)-but there is no 
reason to fear that this would lead to any practical difficulties. 
As to the substantive provisions of the Bulletin, it might be remarked that in 
a few respects these do not reflect the most recent developments-presumably 
because they were based on a draft prepared by ICRC experts in 1995. One of 
these is the failure to refer, in the recitation in the last sentence of paragraph 
6.2, which is evidently based on the original three protocols to the 1980 Inhu, 
mane Weapons Convention,75 to the blinding laser weapons prohibited by the 
1995 Protocol IV to ·the ConventionJ6 Of course, it should not be difficult to 
correct any oversights or to make other desired changes in the Bulletin, as the 
Secretary,General can issue addenda, amendments or revisions at any time. 
Special Protection of UN Forces 
In considering the applicability ofIHL to UN forces, account should also be 
taken of several recent treaties by which the States parties are to accord special 
protection to these forces, as well as to other related UN operations and per' 
sonnel and to those of other intergovernmental and even non,governmental 
organizations. In this connection, it should be noted that the principal IHL 
treaties, in particular 1949 Geneva Convention IV and 1977 Protocol I, do 
contain provisions protecting humanitarian activities carried out by organiza, 
tions of a non,military character,77 which might apply to UN operations such as 
those ofUNHCR, UNICEF and the World Food Programme, but not to any 
Blue Helmet force. 
The first protective provision referring directly to UN forces appeared in the 
1980 Mines ProtocoI78 to the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention,79 in 
which Article 8, "Protection of United Nations forces and missions from the 
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effects of minefields, mines and booby~traps," deals in paragraph 1 with "a 
United Nations force or mission [that] performs functions of a peacekeeping, 
observation or similar function" and in paragraph 2 with "a United Nations 
fact~finding mission." This Protocol was considerably expanded and strength~ 
ened, also in respect of the above~mentioned provisions, by an amendment 
adopted on May 3, 1996, at a Review Conference for the Convention.BO 
On December 9, 1994, the General Assembly, in response to ever more fre~ 
quent attacks on United Nations peace~keeping and similar forces and opera~ 
tions and the significant toll these were taking in deaths and injuries, adopted 
the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Auxiliary Personnel.B1 As 
already pointed out, Article 2 of the Convention excludes its application to 
Chapter VII operations. Paragraph 1.2 of the new Bulletin explicitly provides 
that its promulgation does not "affect the protected status of members of peace~ 
keeping operations" under the Convention, "as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict." 
Finally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal CourtB2 includes in 
the definition of "war crimes" that are to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court: 
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled 
to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the intemationallaw 
of armed conflict; 
whether these take place in an "international armed conflict" or in an "armed 
conflict not of an international character."B3 Here again, UN forces engaged in 
actual combat operations would seem to be excluded-though it is not clear to 
what extent this depends on their establishment under Charter Chapter VIYz 
or VII. 
Positive Obligations of UN Forces 
In connection with some UN operations, especially those with very limited 
mandates, the question has arisen to what extent their personnel are required 
or even allowed to intervene in violations ofIHL that they can actually observe 
or of which they are otherwise reliably informed. 
UN forces are generally restricted to operating within their mandates; this is 
especially true when these mandates, as in all Chapter VIYz situations, depend 
on the consent of all parties to a conflict. Furthermore, the forces are in 
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practical terms restricted by their small size and feeble armaments, which are 
usually quite limited in Chapter VIYz and even in Chapter VII operations. The 
conditions under which a given force may be allowed to use force in situations 
other than strict self-defense, that is, in defense of other persons, may be cov-
ered in its rules of engagement; currently, consideration is being given to draft-
ing a set of model rules of engagement for UN peace-keeping operations in 
which instructions on this point might be included. The sentiment has been 
expressed that UN forces should be given mandates, and presumably appropri-
ate arms, to prevent violations ofIHL of which they become aware.84 
Finally it should be noted that whenever the United Nations is in de facto, and 
especially if in de jure, control of any territory, then it may have a legal as well as a 
moral obligation to prevent, as far as it is able, violations ofIHL in such territory. 
Cooperation with International Tribunals 
With the establishment by the Security Council of the two ad hoc War 
Crimes Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via85 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,86 and the possible 
creation of additional ones at least before the entry into force of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, another set of problems has arisen for certain 
UN forces and for related UN civilian operations-to what extent are these 
forces and operations obliged to cooperate with tribunals, in particular by mak-
ing available knowledgeable persons as witnesses, as well as relevant 
documentation? 
Liminally, it is possible to take two conceptually different approaches to 
these questions. When a question arises as to cooperation between a Security 
Council-established UN force and a Council-established tribunal, it could be 
held that it is one that ultimately the Council must determine. Thus, if the Sec-
retary-General, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of a UN force, de-
termines that certain cooperation demanded by a tribunal would be inimical to 
some aspect of the operation 'of the force, he or the tribunal would refer this 
conflict to the Council and secure its determination whether in a given in-
stance (or a class ofinstances) one or the other of these subsidiary organs of the 
Council should prevail. 
Alternat~vely-and this is the approach that has actually been 
adopted-the Secretary-General can, in light of the complete judicial inde-
pendence of the tribunals, treat them essentially at arms length and apply by 
analogy the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and 
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Immunities of the United Nations, which in respect of the courts and other au, 
thorities of States parties (but not of international tribunals) provides that: 
Privileges and immunities are granted to [officials] [experts] in the interests of 
the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals 
themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive 
the immunity of any [official] [expert] in any case where, in his opinion, the 
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without 
prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.87 
Applying this principle to the military members of UN forces and to civilian 
members of these and other UN operations, such persons are to be made avail, 
able to a UN tribunal when this can be done without prejudice to the interests 
of these forces and operations. In addition, the Secretary,General has decided 
that it is also his duty to act equitably as between the tribunals' prosecutor and 
the defendants, so that assistance rendered to one side (e.g., in interviewing 
potential witnesses) must equally be rendered to the other. That is, the Secre, 
tary-General will, in appropriate cases, waive any conceptual immunity, and 
both authorize and direct cooperation. Presumably, should a tribunal not be 
satisfied with the Secretary,General's cooperation, it could complain to the Se, 
curity Council. 
In the case of a military member of a force contingent provided by a UN mem, 
ber State, the latter must evidently give its consent, whether or not the soldier is 
one still in active service with the United Nations or has returned to his home 
country. These States are under an obligation to cooperate with the tribunals 
pursuant to their respective Statutes, which are binding on member States under 
Charter Articles 25 and 48.1.88 Nevertheless, to the extent that a UN tribunal 
requires information or testimony from such personnel that was acquired while 
in UN service, the Secretary,General's authorization is also required. 
Possible objections to full cooperation with a tribunal's demands can derive 
from several considerations: safety of the potential witness (e.g., if s/he continues 
to serve in an area controlled by associates of an accused); security and effective, 
ness of the mission; and the confidentiality of the internal affairs of the United 
Nations (e.g., the process by which an operational decision was reached). 
In practice, the United Nations has allowed military and civilian personnel 
to be interviewed by the prosecutor and/or by defense counsel and to testify be, 
fore the tribunals. For example, General Dallaire, Commander of the UN Ob-
server Mission Uganda,Rwanda (UNOMUR), who was a Canadian officer 
seconded to the United Nations and thus served as a UN staff member, was 
first permitted to be interviewed by representatives of both the prosecutor and 
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of defense counsel for Jean~Paul Akayesu. Later, the Secretary~General autho~ 
rized him to testify before the Rwanda Tribunal on matters relevant to the 
charges against Akayesu, but not on matters internal to the United Nations or 
UNOMUR. In giving his testimony, the General was accompanied by a mem~ 
ber of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, who advised the Tribunal as to the mean~ 
ing of the restriction in the waiver. 
Similar considerations apply to making available documents and files to the 
tribunals, their prosecutor, and defense counsel. An additional consideration 
in respect of requests for documents is that these must be reasonable in terms of 
the quantity of files involved, especially if a request evidently amounts to a 
"fishing expedition." 
As to the arrest of persons indicted by a UN tribunal, any obligation of a UN 
force to do so would depend in the first instance on its mandate (established by 
the Security Council) and in practice on the realistic possibility of accomplish~ 
ing the task in light of, inter alia, the actual military resources available. 
In due course, arrangements will have to be made with the International 
Criminal Court for the provision of information and documents and for dealing 
with requests for the release ofinformation made available in confidence by the 
United Nations to a State and then requested from the latter by the Court.89 
Presumably such arrangements will reflect the UN's experience in respect of its 
own tribunals. 
Reflections and Proposals 
The promulgation by the Secretary~General of his Bulletin on the obser~ 
vance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law would seem 
to lay to rest any possible doubts as to both the obligation and the readiness of 
these forces to comply with IHL in all appropriate situations, that is, when such 
forces are actually engaged in combat. 
The long reluctance of the organization to state so generally and unequivo~ 
cally, and any lingering national objections now that it has done so, probably re~ 
flect the still prevailing ambivalence about the deployment of such forces. This 
ambivalence, in tum, reflects several considerations: concern for State sover~ 
eignty threatened by ever~increasing encroachments of international organiza~ 
tions; an essentially pacifist inclination that even in the face of major 
provocations and great evils, the United Nations should perform its tasks 
through diplomacy rather than military force; the somewhat mixed record of the 
many operations hastily mounted in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold 
War and the resulting doubts about the ability of international organizations to 
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conduct military operations effectively; and finally, the mixed reactions some 
States may have about any given operation, arising from historical alliances and 
prejudices or genuinely different interests. In spite of this ambivalence, it should 
be recognized that as the world community is at present constituted, there will be 
occasions, whether many or few, when the use of collective military force will be 
necessary-just as was foreseen half a century ago by the founders of the United 
Nations. What is important is that such use of force always reflect the collective 
will of the world community, and at present such collective will can be expressed 
only through the competent organs of the United Nations. 
What is equally important is that when military force is used by the world com, 
munity, it should invariably be subject to the civilizing restraints of interna, 
tional humanitarian law, as expressed in relevant customary international law 
and especially as set out in numerous universal treaty instruments-including 
those that were negotiated and adopted only recently by great majorities in in, 
ternational fora, even if these have not yet been formally ratified by all States. 
In other words, if and when the United Nations-always reluctantly-sallies 
forth to do battle, it should only do so subject to all restraints that reflect the 
most advanced humanitarian principles on which a large measure of-but not 
necessarily universal-agreement has been reached. The Secretary,General's 
Bulletin is well designed to help to ensure that this be so. 
Although there can be no doubt that the Secretary, General had the author, 
ity to promulgate the Bulletin, it would certainly acquire greater gravitas and 
receive more respect from States and even from unofficial armed forces if it 
were explicitly endorsed by the competent political organs, ideally by the Gen, 
eral Assembly acting on a recommendation of the Security Council. Further, 
more, the Council could and should provide that the fundamental principles 
and rules set out in the Bulletin---or at least a general statement about the need 
to observe IHL-should also apply to all military operations authorized by the 
Council, whether as a delegated or franchised military operation under Charter 
Article 42, or in self,defense under Article 51, or carried out by a regional orga, 
nization under Article 53.1 
Now that the extensive spadework to articulate a set of IHL principles and 
rules has been accomplished, it is important to see to their full implementation. 
In particular, the undertaking set out in Section 3 of the Bulletin, that the 
members of all UN forces will be made fully acquainted with the principles and 
rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military person, 
nel, should be carried out-which will evidently require the cooperation of ac, 
tual and potential troop,contributing States. The result should be to raise the 
standards by which these forces operate so as to leave no doubt that in all 
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instances not only the letter but the spirit of international humanitarian law is 
being scrupulously observed. Even in the sorry business of war, the United Na, 
tions should establish the highest legal standard and set the best example. 
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Secretariat 6 August 1999 
Secretary-General's Bulletin 
Observance by United Nations forces ofinternational humanitarian law 
The Secretary-General, for the pur-
pose of setting out fundamental principles and rules 
of international humanitarian law applicable to 
United Nations forces conducting operations under 
United Nations command and control, promulgates 
the following: 
Section 1 
Field of application 
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of in-
ternational humanitarian law set out in the present 
bulletin arc applicable to Unitcd Nations forces 
when in situations of armed conflict they arc activcly 
engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for 
the duration of their engagcment. They arc accord-
ingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peace-
keeping operations when the use of force is 
permitted in self-defcnce. 
1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin docs not af-
fect the protected status of members of peacekeeping 
operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety 
of United Nations and Associated Personncl or their 
status as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled 
to the protection given to civilians under the interna-
tionallaw of armed conflict. 
Section 2 
Application of national law 
The present provisions do not constitute an ex-
haustive list of principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law binding upon military personnel, 
and do not prejudice the application thcreof, nor do 
they replace the national laws by which military per-
sonnel remain bound throughout the operation. 
Section 3 
Status-of-forces agreement 
In the status-of-forees agreement concluded be-
tween the United Nations and a State in whose terri-
tory a United Nations force is dcployed, the United 
Nations undertakes to ensure that the force shall con-
duct its operations with full respect for the principles 
and rules ofthe general conventions applicable to the 
conduct of military personnel. The United Nations 
also undertakes to ensure that members of the mili-
tary personnel ofthe force are fully acquainted with 
the principles and rules of those international instru-
ments. The obligation to respect the said principles 
and rules is applicable to United Nations forces even 
in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement. 
Section 4 
Violations of international humanitarian law 
In ease of violations ofinternational humanitar-
ian law, members of the military personnel of a 
United Nations force are subject to prosecution in 
their national courts. 
Section 5 
Protection of the civilian population 
5.1 The United Nations force shall make a clear 
distinction at all times between eivilians and com-
batants and between civilian objects and military ob-
jectives. Military operations shall be directed only 
against combatants and military objectives. Attacks 
on eivilians or civilian objects are prohibited. 
5.2 Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded 
by this section, unless and for such time as they take 
a direct part in hostilities. 
5.3 The United Nations force shall take all feasi-
ble precautions to avoid, and in any event to mini-
mize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian property. • 
5.4 In its area of operation, the United Nations 
force shall avoid, to the extent feasible, locating mil-
itary objectives within or ncar densely populated ar-
eas, and take all necessary precautions to protect the 
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian 
objects against the dangers resulting from military 
operations. Military installations and equipment of 
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peacekeeping operations, as such, shall not be con-
sidered military objectives. 
5.5 The United Nations force is prohibited from 
launching operations of a nature likcly to strikc mili-
tary objcctives and civilians in an indiscriminate 
manner, as wcll as operations that may bc cxpectcd 
to cause incidental loss of life among the civilian 
popUlation or damage to civilian objccts that would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated. 
5.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in 
reprisals against civilians or civilian objects. 
Section 6 
Means and methods of combat 
6.1 The right of the United Nations force to 
choose methods and means of combat is not 
)mlimited. 
6.2 The United Nations force shall respect the 
rules prohibiting or restricting the usc of certain 
weapons and methods of combat under the relevant 
instruments of international humanitarian law. 
These include, in particular, the prohibition on the 
usc of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bi-
ological methods of warfare; bullcts which explode, 
expand or flatten easily in the human body; and cer-
tain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conven-
tional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, 
anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary 
weapons, is prohibited. 
6.3 The United Nations force is prohibited from 
employing methods of warfare which may cause su-
perfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which 
are intended, or may be expected to cause, wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment. 
6.4 The United Nations force is prohibited from 
using weapons or methods of combat of a nature to 
cause unnecessary suffering. 
6.5 It is forbidden to order that there shall be no 
survivors 
6.6 The United Nations force is prohibited from 
attacking monuments of art, architecture or history, 
archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship 
and museums and libraries which constitute the cul-
tural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of op-
eration, the United Nations force shall not usc such 
cultural property or their immediate surroundings 
for purposes which might expose them to destruction 
or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any 
act of vandalism directed against cultural property is 
strictly prohibited. 
6.7 The United Nations force is prohibited from 
attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and 
drinking-water installations and supplies. 
6.8 The United Nations force shall not make in-
stallations containing dangerous forces, namely 
dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating sta-
tions, the object of military operations if such opcra-
tions may cause thc release of dangerous forces and 
consequent severe losses among the civilian 
population. 
6.9 The United Nations force shall not engage in 
reprisals against objects and installations protected 
under this section. 
Section 7 
Treatment of civilians and persons liars de 
combat 
7.1 Persons not, or no longer, taking part in mili-
tary operations, ineluding civilians, members of 
armed forces who have laid down their weapons and 
persons placed bars de combat by reason of sick-
ness, wounds or detention, shall, in all circum-
stances, be treated humanely and without any 
adverse distinction based on race, sex, religious con-
victions or any other ground. They shall be accorded 
full respect for their person, honour and religious 
and other convictions. 
7.2 The following acts against any ofthe persons 
mentioned in section 7.1 arc prohibited at any time 
and in any place: violence to life or physical integ-
rity; murder as well as cruel treatment such as tor-
ture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; 
reprisals; the taking of hostages; rape; enforced pros-
titution; any form of sexual assault and humiliation 
and degrading treatment; enslavement; and pillage. 
7.3 Women shall be especially protected against 
any attack, in particular against rape, enforced pros-
titution or any other form of indecent assault. 
7.4 Children shall be the object of special respect 
and shall be protected against any form of indecent 
assault. 
Section 8 
Treatment of detained persons 
The United Nations force shall treat with human-
ity and respect for their dignity detained members of 
the armed forces and other persons who no longer 
take part in military operations by reason of deten-
tion. Without prejudice to their legal status, they 
shall be treated in accordance with the relevant pro-
visions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as 
may be applicable to them mlltatis nllltandis. In 
particular: 
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(a) Their eapture and detention shall be notified 
without delay to the party on whieh they depend and 
to the Central Tracing Agency of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC), in particular in 
order to inform their families; 
(b) They shall be held in secure and safe pre-
mises which provide all possible safeguards of hy-
giene and health, and shall not be detained in areas 
exposed to the dangers of the combat zone; 
(e) They shall be entitled to receive food and 
clothing, hygiene and medical attention; 
(d) They shall under no circumstances be sub-
jected to any form of torture or ill-treatment; 
(e) Women whose liberty has been restricted 
shall be held in quarters separated from men's quar-
ters, and shall be under the immediate supervision of 
women; 
(f) In cases where children who have not attained 
the age of sixteen years take a direct part in hostilities 
and arc arrested, detained or intemed by the Unitcd 
Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from 
special protection. In particular, they shall be held in 
quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except 
when aecommodated with their families; 
(g) ICRC's right to visit prisoners and detained 
persons shall be respected and guaranteed. 
Section 9 
Protection of the wounded, the sick, and med-
ical and relief personnel 
9.1 Members of the armed forces and other per-
sons in the power of the United Nations force who 
are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected 
in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely 
and rcceive the medical care and attention required 
by their condition, without adverse distinction. Only 
urgcnt medical reasons will authorize priority in the 
order of treatment to be administered. 
9.2 Whenever circumstances permit, a suspen-
sion of fire shall be arranged, or other local arrange-
mcnts made, to permit the search for and 
identification of the wounded, the sick and the dead 
left on the battlefield and allow for their collection, 
removal, exchange and transport. . 
9.3 The United Nations force shall not attack 
medical establishments or mobile medical units. 
Thcse shall at all times be respected and protected, 
unlcss they are used, outside their humanitarian 
functions, to attack or othcrwise commit harmful 
acts against the United Nations force. 
9.4 The United Nations force shall in all circum-
stances respect and protect medical personnel exclu-
sivcly engaged in the search for, transport or 
treatment ofthe wounded or sick, as well as religious 
pcrsonnel. 
9.5 The United Nations force shall respect and 
protcct transports of wounded and sick or medical 
equipment in the same way as mobile medical units. 
9.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in 
reprisals against the wounded, the sick or the person-
nel, establishments and equipment protected under 
this section. 
9.7 The United Nations force shall in all circum-
stanccs respect the Red Cross and Red Crescent em-
blems. These emblems may not be employed except 
to indicate or to protect mcdical units and medical 
establishments, personnel and material. Any misuse 
of the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems is 
prohibited. 
9.S The United Nations force shall respeet the 
right of the families to know about the fate of their 
sick, wounded and deceased relatives. To this end, 
the force shall facilitate the work of the ICRC Cen-
tral Tracing Agency. 
9.9 The United Nations force shall facilitate the 
work of relief operations which are humanitarian 
and impartial in character and conducted without 
any adverse distinction, and shall respect personnel, 
vchicles and premises involved in such operations. 
Section 10 
Entry into force 
The present bulletin shall enter into force on 12 
August 1999. 
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan 
Secretary-General 
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Appendix" 
SOURCES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECRETARY~GENERAL'S BULLETIN IN 
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P-I: A 48, (51) 
P-I: A 51.3 
P-I: A 57.2 (a) (ii) 
P-I: A 58(b), (c) 
P-I: A 51.4 (end), .5(b), 57.2 (iii) 
P-I: A 51.6, 52.1 
P-I: A 35.1; (H~IVR: A 22) 
(1868 St. Petersb. Decl.; 1899 Hague Deels. 2, 3; 1925 Geneva 
Protocol; Inhumane Weapons Conv., Protocols I-III; Chemical 
Weapons Conv.; Oslo/Ottawa Landmines Conv.) 
P-I: A 35.2, .3 (55) 
P-I: A 35.2; (1968 St. Petersb. Decl.; H-IVR:A 23 (e» 
P-I: A 40; P-II: A 4.1 (H-IVR: A 23 (d» 
(H-IVR: A 27; H-IX A. 5; 1954 Hague Cony. Cult. Prop. P-I: A 
53 (a); P-II: A 16) 
P-I: A 54.2 
P-I: A56.1 
P-I: A 53 (c), 54.4, 56.4 
G-I/IV: A 3(1); P-I: A 75.1; (P-II: A 4.1) 
G-I/IV: A 3(1); P-I: A 75.2; (P-II: A 4.2) 
P-I: A 76.1; G-IV: A 27 
P-I: A 77.1 
(G-III: A 69, 70) 
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(O-III: A 26-30) 
(O-III: A 13,17 (4),87(3); ICCPR: A 7; Torture Conv.: A 2) 
(O-III: A 25 (4), 108 (2); O-IV: 76(4),85(4),124(3» 
(O-IV: A 76 (5); P-I: A 77.3-4) 
(O-III: A 126(4» 
0-1: A 12 (1)-(3) 
0-1: A 15 (3) 





P-I: A 32,33.3 (0-1: A 16(3); O-III: A 122 (2); O-IV: A 140 (2» 
(P-I: A 81.1-4) 
Notations 
Article 
1949 Oeneva Conventions I, II, III or IV. 
Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Naval Bombardment in 
Time of War 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1977 Protocol I or II to the 1949 Oeneva Conventions 
Items in the second column of the table that are not enclosed in parentheses 
are ones that are fully or in part paraphrased in at least part of the indicated 
paragraph of the Bulletin; items enclosed within parentheses are not directly 
paraphrased, and may have merely been sources of inspiration of the indicated 
paragraph of the Bulletin. 
The texts of the IHL instruments referred to in the above table can be found, 
inter alia, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 42. 
537 
